The premises and assumptions advanced by scholars of democratic backsliding do not easily translate well within the MENA region. The MENA series on several Arab states stretching from Morocco to Yemen share similar claims of authoritarian, rather than democratic resilience. The case for democratic backsliding across the MENA region displays different trend of a democratic rollback, specific to Tunisia primarily the country with the longest set of Arab Spring democratization reforms (2011-2021), and only secondarily to Egypt and Libya where democratization was short-lived (2011-2013). MENA’s democratization ‘stories’ by and large reflect continuous manipulation of mostly state-led reforms that do not endure the tests of regional war, sectarianism, securitization of politics, and tribal divides. In particular, the atrophy of democratization, especially post Arab Spring, may be broadly interpreted through two interconnected dynamics, one regional and the other international. At the regional level, counter-revolutions undermined the gains acquired by civil and political societies after the 2011 uprisings that resulted in ousters of fiercely authoritarian regimes (e.g. Tunisia followed by Egypt, Libya and Yemen). Incipient democratization processes were dismantled though a brand of solidarity of autocratic forces in the region (with some participation from Arab rich oil-states). Internationally, both the EU and the US more or less abandoned their early democracy promotion agendas in the MENA region. The focus turned to sustaining regimes that could police terrorism and migration. This enabled authoritarian regimes to take advantage of Western disinterest in democratization to neutralize outside pressure, relying increasingly on executive powers to regress on reforms and use courts and draconian measures to shrink civic spaces and undermine all opposition and free political competition.